This paper presents a simple means-of-payment-in-advance model where households can purchase the single consumption good with either deposits from a price taking representative bank or cash. We show that even if facilitating trade through deposits is physically costly, such trade occurs in equilibrium if banks face a low enough reserve ratio. Thus it is possible that fractional reserve banking occurs in the unique equilibrium, but is strictly dominated by the equilibrium associate with a 100% reserve ratio, even when bank runs are explicitly ruled out. * The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
Introduction:
Fractional reserve banking is, to put it mildly, problematic. Banks with fractional reserves have been historically subject to runs and panics with arguably enormous external effects. Further, banks are costly. Even abstracting from runs and panics (as we do in this paper), the banking sector uses up real resources -labor and capital -which could be put to alternative uses. But fractional reserve banking is also ubiquitous. It appears to occur throughout history, with our without bailouts, making it difficult to argue that this ubiquity is due simply to bailouts or government subsidies.
Usually, the ubiquity of an economic arrangement itself argues that this arrangement serves a valuable social purpose. Historically, one such purpose is that banks have allowed individuals and firms to pay for goods and services through their provision of bank checks and other widely accepted claims. Therefore, those individuals and firms haven't had to resort to costly barter or non-interest bearing specie trade.
In this paper, we raise the possibility that this facilitation of trade using interest bearing deposits serves a privately useful function, while providing lower (and perhaps negative) social benefits. In one simple example we provide, banks are worse than useless in that they use up real resources but provide no societal benefit, and this is true even when we explicitly rule out significant societal costs such as bank runs. The more general point we wish to make is that the private benefits from creating private payments systems may exceed the social benefits.
In this paper's model, bank provision of payments services through demand deposits results in private decisions by households to use these lower-private-cost deposits rather than higher-privatecost cash, and that doing so increases the money supply. This extra money increases prices generally, an external cost that no household takes into account when choosing between holding cash or holding deposits in making transactions. This divergence between private and social costs is thus the wasteful result of bank-provided payments services.
Our paper is related to a large literature in money and banking. Our paper has in common with Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) that private money creation uses real resources so that inflation stimulates the demand for private money and has real costs. They focus on the welfare costs of inflation while our focus is on examining the benefits and costs of changes in reserve requirements.
Our paper is also related to Monnet and Sanches (2011) who show, among other results, that 100% reserve requirements may be undesirable. Their result derives from lack of commitment of bankers to repay depositors. We also show that 100% reserve requirements may be undesirable, but our results derive from comparing the costs of private money creating versus the insurance benefits associated with private money.
Other papers, see for example Gu et.al. (2012) have developed theories of banking using mechanism design approaches. Almost by construction, such theories imply that allocations are efficient. While we believe such an approach is very useful, in our paper we focus on inefficiencies that could arise when private and social interests do not coincide.
Finally, our paper is related to an extensive literature on so called "pecuniary externalities" that arise when prices enter consumption or production sets. See, for instance, Kehoe and Levine (1993) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Lorenzoni (2008) , and Hart and Zingales (2011) . Perhaps the most closely related of these is Hart and Zingales (2011) who develop a four-period model in which they argue that private liquidity provision can be inefficiently high due to a pecuniary externality.
They do not analyze the welfare effects of fractional reserve banking.
The Model:
The model is a simple, infinitely repeated, means-of-payment-in-advance economy. There exists a unit continuum of identical households, a single price-taking representative bank, and a monetary authority whose sole function is to (possibly) make lump sum monetary transfers to households. Time is discrete and is denoted t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
The commodities in the economy are a single, divisible, non-storable consumption good, of which each household receives a constant endowment y, and a commodity which we refer to as "gold". Gold can take three forms: coins (m), which can be used to facilitate trade, gold bars (g b ), which can be used by the bank as reserves, and jewelry (g h ), which brings direct enjoyment to the owner. At the beginning of each period, gold can be linearly and costlessly transformed across its three forms. Thus for each date t ≥ 0,
where G t is the aggregate supply of gold at date t. We assume G 0 = 1 and
At each date t, the bank is assumed to be able to freely create deposits, d t , subject to a constraint that αd t ≤ g bwhere c t is consumption, θ t ∈ Θ is a publicly observed ideosyncratic i.i.d. preference shock, and g h is gold held by the household in non-monetary form (jewelry). If v(g h ) = 0 for all g h , then gold is interpreted as a fiat currency. So that a stationary equilibrium exists we assume Assumption 1. Either v(g h ) = 0 for all g h (fiat currency) or G t = 1 for all t (η = 0 or gold is in fixed supply).
A. Markets:
At the beginning of each period, t, households can freely transform gold between coins and jewelry, and there exists a market among households and the bank with trade in gold, deposits, and promises to deliver gold at the beginning of the next period contingent on the (yet to be realized) taste shock θ t . Let q t (θ t ) be the price of claim to a unit of θ t -contingent gold next period and let x t (θ t ) denote the quantity of θ t -contingent gold a household purchases. (If x t (θ t ) < 0, then the household has sold a promise to deliver gold if his taste shock turns out to be θ t .) Also assume households are free at this point to obtain gold directly from the bank, one for one, by presenting deposits to the bank. That is, a deposit is considered to be a legal right to trade deposits for gold with the bank, one-for-one. Households may also give gold to the bank in return for deposits, again, one-for-one, if the bank chooses to create the deposit. We further assume, as part of this market structure, that a deposit entails a legal requirement on the bank to pay a market determined rate of interest, r t , to the depositor, one period later. These assumptions deliver the household budget constraint in this market as
where w t is the household's beginning of period wealth in terms of coins, deposits and jewelry.
After the financial markets close, each household receives its endowment of y units of the consumption good and realizes its i.i.d. preference shock θ ∈ Θ. (Let π(θ t ) denote the fraction of households with shock θ t .) Households then split into shopper-seller pairs.
Sellers inelastically supply y units to market. Shoppers buy the consumption good using either deposits or gold coins, where p c t is the price of consumption in terms of either form of payment.
Let c m t (θ t ) denote the consumption purchases of a type θ t using coins and c d t (θ t ) denote the consumption purchases of a type θ t household using deposits. Shoppers face means-of-payment-in-advance constraints that
An allocation is resource feasible if for all t ≥ 0
and
An allocation is a competitive equilibrium if it is resource feasible and solves the household and bank problems outlined below. To simplify somewhat, we only consider allocations where prices p c t , r t , and q t (θ) are all constants.
A. Household Problem:
Given constant prices, the household problem is recursive (in beginning of period wealth relative to the aggregate gold supply) and can be expressed as
as well as conditions that all choice variables other than x(θ) be non-negative. Let µ be the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (??) and π(θ)γ m (θ) and π(θ)γ d (θ) be the Lagrange multipliers on the cash in advance constraints (??) and (??).
B. Bank Problem:
At all dates, the representative bank is free to create deposits, d t , subject to the constraint that αd t ≤ g b t , where g b t is the banks reserve holdings of gold. Further, the creation of a deposit d t obligates the bank to pay rd t to the depositor at all future dates starting at date t + 1 (assuming, without loss, that the deposit is never destroyed.) Thus a choice of (d t , g b t ) must solve
subject to αd t ≤ g b t , where q ≡ θ q(θ), or the unconditional price at date t to a unit of gold at date t + 1.
Stationary Equilibria:
To characterize stationary equilibria (equilibria with constant prices), first consider the first order condition with respect to x(θ) in the household problem, or
If q(θ) = βπ(θ)/(1 + η), this becomes
for all θ. Thus given q(θ) = βπ(θ)/(1 + η), w (θ) is independent of θ. Further, standard envelope arguments imply V (w) = µ, thus
for all θ, which implies w (θ) = w for all θ. In words, when q(θ) = βπ(θ)/(1 + η), a condition of household optimization is that household wealth is constant over all dates and all histories of preference shocks. That
is from now on imposed.
Next, consider the implications of profit maximization by the representative bank. If one substitutes that bank's reserve requirement, αd t ≤ g b t , at equality into its objective function (??) it
which is linear in d. Thus a necessary condition for maximization (which also implies zero profits)
is that the bracketed expression in (??) equal zero, or
or that the interest rate on deposits equals (1 − α) times the nominal interest rate.
A. Further Characterization Proposition 1. There exists a cutoff interest rate on deposits r * = Proof. Consider the household problem. The first order condition with respect to d (ignoring nonnegativity and imposing (??)) delivers
Let c(θ) = c d (θ) + c m (θ). The first order condition with respect to c d (θ) and imposing (??) delivers
which implies
Together, (??) and (??) imply
Next, the first order condition with respect to m (again ignoring non-negativity and imposing (??)) delivers
and the first order condition with respect to c m (θ) and imposing (??) delivers
Note that the left hand sides of equation (??) and (??) are identical. Thus m and d can both be positive only if the right hand sides are equal or
Let r * solve (??) or
The result follows immediately.
An equilibrium with d = 0 and m > 0 is referred to as a cash equilibrium. An equilibrium with d > 0 and m = 0 is referred to as a banking equilibrium.
Corollary 1.
There exists a cutoff reserve ratio α * ≡ 1+η−β(1+φ) (1+η−β)(1+φ) such that if α > α * , a banking equilibrium cannot exist, and if α < α * , a cash equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof. Since r is a function of the reserve ratio α, one can solve for α * -the cutoff reserve ratio by equating the right hand sides of (??) and (??) to derive Proof. For households to be willing to transact using deposits, one needs r ≥ (1+η)φ β(1+φ) . For the representative bank to be willing to create deposits, it needs r ≤ (1 − α)( 1+η β − 1). Thus one needs
Since the right hand side of (??) is decreasing in α, setting α = 0 relaxes (??) as much as possible.
Thus if 
Welfare:
If v(g h ) = 0 for all g h (fiat money) and Ω is a singleton (no preference shocks), then characterization and welfare analysis is greatly simplified. and d = 1/α. Goods market clearing implies (1 + φ)c = y, and the cash-in-advance constraint,
Thus the stationary banking equilibrium can be described as follows: Each period, a house- Proposition 2. Suppose v(g h ) = 0 for all g h (fiat money) and Ω is a singleton (no preference shocks). Then the cash equilibrium dominates the banking equilibrium (or the optimal policy is α = 1).
Proof. In the cash equilibrium, steady state consumption is equal to y. In the banking equilibrium, steady state consumption is equal to y/(1 + φ).
A useful question is why a household doesn't deviate and use cash in the banking equilibrium, since its utility in the cash equilibrium is higher than in the banking equilibrium. The simple answer is that it can't afford to. Steady state wealth is the same (w = 1) in both equilibria. But the price level is 1/α times higher in the banking equilibrium, since the supply of "money" (assets which can be used for trade) is 1/α times higher in the banking equilibrium. Thus a household which used only cash and didn't borrow in the banking equilibrium could only afford 1/p c = αy units of consumption in the first period. (In subsequent periods, the household could afford to purchase y units of consumption each period.) Consuming y/(1 + φ) units of the consumption good each period is preferable to consuming αy units in the first period, and y units thereafter. Now this is not the only deviation where only cash is used. The deviating household could borrow from the bank, for instance, to smooth consumption and nevertheless only use cash. However, the point remains that that using cash in every period to purchase y units of consumption as in the cash equilibrium is not in a household's constraint set when p c = 1/α. Further, the effect on the price level of the increase in the money supply induced by a household's decision to use deposits is external to that household. This externality, through the means-of-payment-in-advance constraints, is the source of the competitive equilibrium inefficiency.
Next, consider when v(g h ) = 0 or when Ω is not a singleton. (As before, assume if v(g h ) = 0, then η = 0, so that a steady state equilibrium exists).
Proposition 3. If θ ∈ {L, H} and α > α * , then steady state expected utility is independent of α.
Proof. Equation (??) and γ m (L) = 0 with (??) implies
or,
This, along with
solve for c(L) and c(H) independently of α.
To solve for g h (jewelry), note that the cash-in-advance constraint holding with equality for θ = H implies the real value of money, or
The first order condition with respect to g h (jewelry) is 
This, along with In words, the first of the previous two propositions states that if α > α * (or that the stationary equilibrium involves only cash), then the actual value of α is irrelevant. Intuitively, if the reserve ratio is high enough to shut down banking, increasing it further has no effects. The second states that if α < α * (or that the stationary equilibrium involves only deposits), then increasing α decreases welfare. Intuitively, if the reserve ratio is low enough to allow banking, decreasing it further increases welfare (or at least that part of welfare which comes from consumption and not jewelry). This occurs because decreasing the reserve ratio increases the equilibrium interest rate on deposits. This allows better insurance across θ shocks. In particular, if α = 0 (or, more carefully, as α → 0 from above to avoid an infinite price level) the equilibrium allocation has the interest rate on deposits equal the nominal interest rate in the credit market and thus mimics the non-cash-in-advance constrained allocation for the economy where each household's per period endowment is y/(1 + φ). Intuitively, fractional reserve banking allows fewer units of gold to be used facilitating trade and more units to be used in a form which directly increases utility.
Conclusion:
We have developed a model in which privately produced money provides a socially useful insurance role and a privately useful but socially costly medium of exchange. We have shown that if reserve requirements are sufficiently low then private money drives out specie as a medium of exchange. We have further shown that if the assets used to back private money have no direct value in preferences or technology and the social value of insurance is sufficiently small, equilibria with fractional reserve banking are necessarily inefficient. Finally, we have shown that if the assets used to back private money have no direct value in preferences or technology, then it is desirable to set reserve requirements either to zero or 100%.
